Every official is at risk of becoming a criminal
Every official serving in the administration of the President of Kazakhstan should clearly understand: he or she will be turned in when Nursultan Nazarbayev deems it convenient or necessary, according to Viktor Khrapunov in a “K Plus” interview.
Viktor Vyacheslavovich, you worked for many years alongside Nursultan Nazarbayev. Can you tell us what you know about him as a person in some detail? For example, the situation in Kazakhstan today resembles events in the Soviet Union during the 1950s, when another dictator directed all of his fears against his circle. Doesn’t it seem so to you?
I can firmly say that Nursultan Nazarbayev, the current President of Kazakhstan, is a very cautious man. Obviously, his life experience has conditioned him to be so. Various facts from his biography force us to make this conclusion. I would say that Nursultan Nazarbayev has exhibited two basic instincts in a very pronounced way: self-preservation and aggrandizement. He exhibits these two instincts better than anyone else. He developed his instinct for self-preservation early in childhood when he had to survive. And when by the will of fate, thanks to Poltoranin1, he became secretary of the regional committee2, then second secretary of the regional party committee, and then Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, it was an incredible jump for him up the job ladder. He owed all of his success to Dinmukhamed Konayev3.
He did not try to conceal this, and he said that he owed everything to this man, who took his hand and led him, allowing him to bypass many career posts that any other person would have had to go through. Only a man who was first secretary of the regional committee of the party, and who had served as the head of various departments of the Central Committee of the Party, could be Secretary of the Central Committee. And only after occupying that post could he become Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.
When I was still mayor of Almaty, I had to meet with people who were close to Konayev and who saw Mr. Nazarbayev when he appeared; they could tell what kind of person he was at that time. One of them told me: “Mr. Mayor, I beseech you… I am the last person who saw how Nazarbayev would denigrate himself before Konayev; he would lick his boots, figuratively speaking. Don’t invite me to meetings with Nazarbayev. Everyone who has seen Nazarbayev’s behavior towards his patron has disappeared. I am now the last one. He will see me, find out, and that will be the end of me. So don’t invite me.”
Thus, the fears that surround Mr. Nazarbayev today have very deep roots.
And what happened to the man that you just were talking about?
I never invited him to meetings with Nazarbayev, though he should have been invited due to his job duties. Frankly, I felt pity for him as a fellow human being. I can’t speak for him right now, but last year he was still living in Almaty. Right now I have lost touch with him, so I don’t know if he is still alive…
What more do you know about the people who were close at one time to Nursultan Nazarbayev during the early stage of his career? Where are they now?
If you look at the Independent Parliament of Kazakhstan of the 12th Convocation, of which I was a deputy, then you will realize that it was a truly independent parliament, and there were deputies who had their own opinions, particular visions of the problems and ways to solve them. Nazarbayev was very afraid of this parliament. It ceased to exist, and in fact resigned, due to the help that others and I provided to him.
Serikbolsyn Abdildin4, the former leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, was firmly convinced that Kazakhstan should be a parliamentary republic. But this vision was at odds with the policies of Nazarbayev, who sought the presidency. He not only sought the presidency, he wanted autocratic power that he would share with no one else. And as for the people who were standing next to him … Well, as far as Serikbolsyn Abdildin is concerned, you know where he is today.
After that, Marat Ospanov was the parliamentary leader5. He was also a singular sort of person with his ego and his strong convictions and opinions. But then he suddenly fell into a coma and died.
Senate Speaker Omurbek Baygeldi6, who boldly expressed his views and eventually left, was also important.
I wouldn’t say that these were people from Nazarbayev’s inner circle…
Let me say a few words about Syzdyk Abishev7, who in fact created the empire that allowed Nazarbayev to complete the first stage of his acquisition of capital (as though he were literally following Marx’s “Das Kapital”). It was in fact stolen from the Kazakh people. Mr. Abishev created trading houses that bought currency products on the cheap from state enterprises and then sold them abroad at market prices. The price difference was deposited in numerous accounts that Mr. Abishev opened in his name and in Nazarbayev’s, to be sure. This allowed Nazarbayev to say afterwards that no one knew what accounts were opened by Abishev, and where this money was being kept.
If you look at the Kazakhgate documents, then you can find specific figures: more than one billion five hundred million dollars were embezzled from the budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan over the previous year due the criminal schemes that were organized by Mr. Abishev.
But when Mr. Nazarbayev no longer needed Abishev, something very interesting happened: Abishev also fell into a coma. Initially, he was held in Moscow and was not brought to Kazakhstan. I could not understand what the reason for this was. I knew Syzdyk Abishev well, and I wanted to go and see him. I asked for the address where he was being kept in Moscow, but no one would give it to me. Before his death he was brought to Almaty, where he died. He was buried in the Kensai Cemetery.
Nazarbayev’s fear created conditions where he was able to get rid of people after they laid the groundwork for the privatization of all of Kazakhstan’s major assets along family lines.
You are saying that Abishev’s death was not entirely random?
I would like to report what our Aqsaqal said, namely that Nursultan Nazarbayev had a fight with Syzdyk Abishev in which Nazarbayev supposedly struck Abishev on the head, after which the latter went in for further treatment and fell into a coma. And everyone says that Syzdyk Abishev did not die a natural death, and it was all engineered to remove the most important witness of Nazarbayev’s illegal gains.
(Apparently, the statement of Karishal Asan-Ata8 is being referred to. He stated that while Nazarbayev was on vacation during the summer of 1997, he invited his chief economic planner, Syzdyk Abishev, and his family to Turkey: “One day the president decided to take a walk with Abishev across the courtyard of the villa. It was clear that disagreements arose during their conversation, and the president unexpectedly hit his companion with such force that the latter fell into an empty swimming pool and broke his head.” Syzdyk Abishev was in a coma for 1 year and 17 days – Ed.)
Generally speaking, privatization in all the CIS countries represent a dark chapter in history…
And if you look at the people who were on the State Property Committee [Goskomimushchestvo]9, who oversaw the process of privatization, then you will notice that today almost none of them remain. Sarybai Kalmurzayev10 played a major role, and he too fell into a coma and died. And there is Rakhanov Maksudbek11, who oversaw the sell offs… Kalmurzayev prepared assets for sale, transferred them to the State Committee on Privatization [Goskomprivat]12, and then Maksudbek sold these assets. He was relieved of all his responsibilities, and I do not know where he is today and what he is doing.
Duberman was the person who specifically oversaw the tender process, who managed it and made sure a particular candidate won. He sat on the State Committee on Privatization (Jozef Duberman, Vice-Chairman of the State Committee on Privatization – Ed.), and he knew all the ins and outs of the privatization process. He has been placed on the international most wanted list.
There are these people who have been specific witnesses to Nazarbayev’s illegal gains, and they became targets of his fear. All the information about them can be uncovered, and documents will come to light about these tenders and the privatization process that occurred … Nazarbayev tried to clean all of this up so that no one would have the ability to accuse him of illicit gains.
Take Zamanbek Nurkadilov13, who was a witness to the illegal privatization of assets in Almaty that was carried out by members of Nazarbayev’s family … I was Nurkadilov’s first deputy and a witness to these processes, which took place in the city. Sarsenbaiuly14, who witnessed the privatization of television and media assets, has also passed away.
Nazarbayev’s fears did not give him any peace, and he took drastic measures to eliminate those people who were and who remained witnesses to his illegal gains. We see that many people have suffered as a result of Nazarbayev’s fears, and I’m sure that people who directly or indirectly were privy to President Nazarbayev’s secret actions will continue to suffer in the future.
How did Nursultan Nazarbayev build personal relationships with his circle, on which the country’s development and political traditions depend? What principle did Nazarbayev use to select people for his circle?
At the time when Kazakhstan had just become independent and self-reliant, then people were still being selected based on the principle of professionalism. In the government that I had the privilege to serve, I worked with people who had moved up the career ladder from miner to manager. They knew first hand what production was. These were real production workers, and they knew how to get results from a particular industry. I now may be the first to announce that Nazarbayev’s policies, which threw Kazakhstan into chaos, artificially complicated the situation that industry was in. The worse things got, the better it was for him.
For example?
The unprecedented decision was made to destroy all state and collective farms. I will tell you frankly: We knew what state and collective farms were. The collective farm stood for collective agriculture, and the state farm stood for socialist agriculture. The state farm was created so that villagers could work 8 hours a day like city workers, have time to rest and so on. But since all state farms were owned by the state, practically all state farms were unprofitable. On the other hand, collective farms were generally profitable. We can still remember that when the results for the financial year were being calculated, leading collective farmers would received 18,000 — 20,000 rubles each. This was a huge incentive for those working on collective farms.
But yet it had to be destroyed. I remember how Vera Sukhorukova15, Deputy Akim (Governor) of the East Kazakhstan Province, destroyed the last stables and divided up all the flocks among the collective farmers.
In other words, whole sectors of the economy were brought to their knees and made to operate in chaotic conditions. I am firmly convinced that so-called industry crises were created artificially.
I can support this claim. Copper was sold abroad and continued to be sold, and zinc and gold continued to be sold. Metal from KarMet16 also continued to be sold as before. But all of this activity, which had been done through the appropriate structures created at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, began to find different channels. And the foreign currency that was obtained from the sale of these products went into the pockets of the president and the people close to him.
If I understand correctly, then the staff recruitment system changed?
Professionals with particular business qualifications were invited at that point in time when such professionals and reforms were needed. This system was instituted under Tereshchenko’s17 government, and he was made prime minister after Karamanov18 so that conditions could be established to assist Mr. Nazarbayev’s illicit gains.
At that time the policy of intervention into the Kazakh consumer goods market was implemented through obtaining loans and grants from the international community. These funds went to the government of Kazakhstan, and already at Nazarbayev’s direction these loans were distributed to his close associates. And in fact a process for the accumulation of capital using grants and loans was implemented. Afterwards it became clear that Tereshchenko had all the information about how, to whom, when, how and to whose team these loans (which later became unrecoverable) were given. Then Nazarbayev decided that he no longer needed Tereshchenko. He was immediately replaced by Kazhegeldin19.
By the way, every prime minister who was appointed by the president immediately wrote a voluntary resignation statement without providing a date. Kazhegeldin mentioned this practice himself. It is likely to assume that the president would not have appointed him to be prime minister without his writing such a statement.
So, what principle informed staff selections?
The main criterion at this time was whether the selection would oblige the president. Those who bowed to the president were given posts. And so what happened? Suffice it for the prime minister to express his own opinion on a particular issue several times, and then a number of specific measures would be organized against him that would allow Nazarbayev to free the post for the next prime minister in the future. The same practice obtained with the appointment of ministers, heads of committees, departments, Akims (governors) of provinces, those posts which oversaw the privatization and land reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
What this meant is that Mr. Nazarbayev began to choose servile people who would fulfill all his orders unconditionally. The president released Kazhegeldin from his duties at his own request, thanked him for his excellent work and decorated him with an award…
The next prime minister, Balgimbayev20, did not have very good organizational skills. He was constantly running to the president, and he could resolve no issue by himself. This system was developed by the president. He was to be the only leader and to solve all the issues, and everyone else would have to please the president, so to speak. Otherwise the person would lose his position.
I remember how, after several calls to the prime minister, I did not get any help, and I had to go to the president and say: “If the prime minister does not resolve issues within his competence, then, Mr. President, take direct presidential initiative and the reforms will proceed a lot faster. And you will stay informed of all events.” He became very interested at my proposal: “What is direct presidential initiative, in your view?” I said that everything would need to be done so that he could become a direct president who runs the country in the same way as, say, the U.S. president. It was clear that he didn’t like my proposal, because it would be easier to continue to blame all the problems on the prime ministers.
Also note that when the law enforcement agencies in Switzerland announced that they had discovered Kazakhgate, which, naturally, was done at the recommendation of Nazarbayev’s lawyer, he immediately got rid of Prime Minister Balginbayev since he was completely tied up in Kazakhgate. He then brought in Giffen, and they decided matters by themselves.
(James Giffen, an American businessman and former adviser to President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. U.S. prosecutors accused Giffen of bribing Nazarbayev and Nurlan Balgimbayev, the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in order to ensure contracts that would allow Western companies to extract Tengiz oil in the 1990s – Ed.)
That is, you want to say that Nazarbayev advanced people who were in complete agreement with his views and interests, and who would give up easily or could be gotten rid of if the situation changed?
Yes, it would only take a small episode of independent behavior on the part of others for him to decide to make short work of these people and send them to oblivion. As soon as Kazakhgate appeared, Balgimbayev was immediately dismissed. And the three ministries overseeing reform were consolidated into one. I was appointed to be the minister of the three joint ministries. The president offered the post to me and said: “Balgimbayev is going to Kazakhoil, and you make sure to subject him to the most intolerable conditions.” Deputy Prime Minister Akhmetzhan Yesimov was the head of the group responsible for the creation of Kazakhoil. He invited me to his office and said: “Give Kazakhoil the minimum it needs, and leave the rest in the ministry.”
And when we, a group of more than 25 people, gathered in Yesimov’s office and began to talk about Kazakhoil, Balgimbayev, the former prime minister and head of the newly created Kazakhoil, spoke and presented a list of everything that he needed to be transferred. I, as minister, could not approve it. I also made a presentation and said that it would be necessary to leave the assets in the ministry, otherwise the ministry would be superfluous. Yesimov supported me. And Balgimbayev said, “Do as you wish, you may accept the minister’s proposal.”
As you can see, in this situation Mr. Nazarbayev adopted a policy of “divide and rule”. He told Balgimbayev one thing, and he told me another, since it was not clear how Kazakhgate would turn out. Some sort of a “backup airfield” was needed in order to draw attention to someone else. To whom, you ask? To Balgimbayev.
I understand, for example, why Nazarbayev had reason to be afraid of Kazhegeldin’s ambitions. But you were just now talking about people who are really far from being first-rank political actors. Is it really true that he could be afraid of such people?
I would say that Nazarbayev is a Soviet person. He came out of that system. And this flawed system that was established under socialism of blaming everything on the previous order was drilled into Nazarbayev, and he promoted and encouraged it. I will give an example. Nurkadilov, in contrast to the first two Secretaries of the Regional Committee, remained Chairman of the Municipal Executive Committee21 of Almaty for a long time. And when the first secretary of the regional committee said that he had only three more days of work, he continued to work. And that same first secretary, who said that the chairman of the municipal executive committee had only three days more, did leave. But Nurkadilov continued working because it has appointed by Konayev. And he defended him, no matter what, because he was Konayev’s puppet.
But this was a completely different situation. I remember Pavlodar Province. I remember North Kazakhstan Province and Kokshetau Province. I recall a number of provinces, including Mangystau Province, where a person was appointed to be governor and given the order to publicize a negative image of the previous Akim (Governor) and to turn him into the president.
What for?
As Nazarbayev said when he pronounced Nurkadilov’s sentence, “the main thing is to catch the person, and the charges come later.” For example, Shalbay Kulmakhanov22 came to Almaty after Nurkadilov’s infamous row with Nazarbayev, and he was ordered to collect dirt on Zamanbek. I was appointed to replace Kulmakhanov in his position. Nazarbayev ordered me to collect dirt about him.
After a month of work Nazarbayev called me: “Well, what evidence have you assembled against your predecessor?” I said that there was too much work to do, and I would need another month. After exactly another month Nazarbayev called me yet again: “Well?” After the third month’s extension I requested an audience with Nazarbayev. I came to him and said: “You have special services. Please, let them do this. I am not able by myself to collect any incriminating evidence”. He stood up and patted me on the shoulder: “I didn’t expect anything less from you. Good job.”
But when he appointed Mr. Tasmagambetov23 to my place, he gave him an order to collect incriminating evidence on me. I found out about this after Tasmagambetov was appointed Akim (Mayor) of Almaty, when we flew with the president to the east where he was to introduce me as the Governor of East Kazakhstan Province. The head of one of the subdivisions sat down with me and said that the the president instructed Tasmagambetov to dig up dirt about me. I said, “Let him try.” I was certain that no one would be able to find any dirt on me. Everything was being done in accordance with the law, so I was calm and confident that Imangali Tasmagambetov would not be able to find anything about me. But I was mistaken. He dug up dirt, and Nazarbayev used it against me later on.
So did this dirt actually work?
Look at what happened in 1998, since we already mentioned Mr. Kazhegeldin. He was dismissed at his own request, and he was decorated with an award. He was recognized and thanked by the president for his services to Kazakhstan. But when Kazhegeldin created his own party, registered its charter and said he would run for president, Nazarbayev immediately issued an order to the National Security Committee, and the dirt which was collected about him was put into action. But Mr. Abykayev24 interfered. He led Kazhegeldin away from the back door to the presidency. Kazhegeldin left him with a statement that thanked him for his collaboration and declared that he would never run as a presidential candidate in Kazakhstan. Thanks to this statement Kazhegeldin was able to step away and leave Akord25 with the victory, so to say.
Nevertheless, after a few days he still decided to declare himself as a presidential candidate. And, of course, he immediately became a criminal within Kazakhstan, or, to be more precise, in the eyes of the president of Kazakhstan. Later on he was declared a criminal and a felon. He was convicted and received a 10-year sentence.
So, the “divide and rule” principle was and still is in effect. And everyone should understand that Nazarbayev will sacrifice any of the members of his team should it prove necessary or advantageous to him.
1 Mikhail Poltoranin was a Russian professional journalist and government figure of the USSR and Russian Federation. From 1964-1986 he worked as a special correspondent for various newspapers.
2 The Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan
3 Dinmukhamed Konayev was a Soviet politician, social activist and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR (1964 – 1986)
4 Serikbolsyn Abdildin was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1991 – 1993)
5 Marat Ospanov was the Chairman of the Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1995 -1999).
6 Omurbek Baygeldi was the Speaker of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1996 – 1999)
7 Syzdyk Abishev has a Ph.D. in economics and is a politician. He served as the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations of Kazakhstan (1990-1994). He is also related to Nursultan Nazarbayev through the latter’s first wife, Sara Nazarbayeva.
8 Karishal Asan-Ata is a writer and winner of a Hellman-Hammett Grant.
9 The State Property Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan
10 Sarybai Kalmurzayev was the Chairman of the State Property Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1994 – 1995), and he acted as the Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1999—2002).
11 Rakhanov Maksudbek was the Chairman of the State Committee on Privatization of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
12 The State Committee on Privatization of the Republic of Kazakhstan
13 Zamanbek Nurkadilov was the mayor of Almaty from 1991 – 1994, the Akim (Governor) of Almaty Province (1997 – 2001) and the Chairman of the Agency of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2001 – 2004).
14 Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly was the Minister of the Press and Mass Media of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1993 – 1995) and Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2001 – 2002).
15 Vera Sukhorukov was Deputy Akim (Governor) of the East Kazakhstan Province (2003 – 2004) and Deputy to the Majilis of the Parliament of Kazakhstan (2004 – 2007).
16 Karaganda Metallurgical Plant
17 Sergey Tereshchenko was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1991-1994).
18 Uzakbai Karamanov was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR (1989 – 1991)
19 Akezhan Kazhegeldin was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1994-1997).
20 Nurlan Balgimbayev was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1997-1999).
21 Municipal Executive Committee [Gorodispolkom]
22 Shalbay Kulmakhanov was the Akim (Mayor) of Alma-Ata (1994 – 1997) and Minister of Emergency Situations (2005 – 2007).
23 Imangali Tasmagambetov was the Assistant to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1993 – 1995), Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2002 – 2003) and Akim (Mayor) of Almaty (2004 – 2008). He has been Akim (Mayor) of Astana since 2008.
24 Nurtai Abykayev was the Head of the Presidential Administration (2002 – 2004), Senate Speaker (2004 – 2007) and Chairman of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2010).
25 The residence of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
